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Abstract Very recently, Barman et al. proposed a multi-server authentication protocol using fuzzy commitment. The
authors claimed that their protocol provides anonymity while resisting all known attacks. In this paper, we analyze that
Barman et al.âĂŹs protocol is still vulnerable to anonymity violation attack and impersonation based on stolen smart
attack; moreover, it has scalability issues. We then propose an improved and enhanced protocol to overcome the security
weaknesses of Barman et al.’s scheme. The security of the proposed protocol is verified using BAN logic and widely accepted
automated AVISPA tool. The BAN logic and automated AVISPA along with the informal analysis ensures the robustness of
the scheme against all known attacks.
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1 Introduction
The multi-server environment provides convenient and suitable online services as unlike conventional single server au-
thentication (SSA), the multi-server environment provides single sign-on without registering with multiple servers and
keeping the multiple secrets of passwords and identities. The multi-server works using the centralized trusted registration
authority, responsible for registering the servers and users, in return it enables both the servers and users to get hassle free
communication with each other. The users keeps only a secret password and an identity. The common use of a multi-server
environment requires an efficient and robust user authentication protocol to establish a secure connection between both the
requesting user and service providers.
In 1981, Lamport [24] presented the first authentication protocol based on a server database containing the passwords of
each registered user. Due to storage of the verifier in server database Lamport’s protocol is subjected to the stolen verifier
attack. Over time, many researchers proposed their protocols to resolve the issues of stolen verifier attack [16,20].Wu et
al.âĂŹs [44] presented a smart card-based authentication protocol; later He et al. [14] noticed that the protocol of Wu
is vulnerable to insider attack and impersonation attack. Wu et al.âĂŹs [44] then presented an improved and enhanced
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2 Rehman et al.
protocol based on He et al.’s protocol. later Zhu et al. [45] found that the protocol of He et al. still has some weaknesses like
offline password guessing attack.
Anticipating the failure and/or unsuitability of two factor authentication protocols, many researchers proposed fingerprint-
based three factor authentication protocols to enhance the security [17,25,26]. Lee et al. [25] presented fingerprint-based
authentication. Lee et al. enhanced the security using three factors including: 1)smart card, 2)fingerprint minutiae, and
3)user password. Later Lin et al.’s [27] claimed that Lee et al.’s protocol has weaknesses against spoofing and masquerade
attacks. So they proposed an enhanced protocol based on Lee et al.’s protocol. Regretfully, Mitchell et al. [33] noticed that
Lin et al.’s protocol still has some weaknesses. Amin et al.’s [2] presented a novel protocol for multi-server architecture in
which the authors claimed that their protocol provides security against the known attacks. Later Das et al.’s [13] noticed
that Amin et al.’s protocol suffers from many attacks. Das et al. also proved that Amin et al.’s protocol does not reinforce
the biometric update.
Mir and Nikooghadam [31] presented an enhanced biometrics-based authentication protocol and claimed their protocol
provides security against well-known attacks like (user anonymity and untraceability, impersonation attacks, Online password
guessing attacks, etc.) Later Chaudhry et al. [11] noticed that Mir and Nikooghadam [31] suffers from user anonymity attack
as well as stolen smart attack. Unfortunately, Qi et al. [35] claimed Chaudhry et al.’s [11] protocol still has some weaknesses
including non-resilience against denial of service attack; moreover, protocol in [11] is lacking perfect forward secrecy.
In 2016, Wang et al. [42] proposed another biometric-based multi-server authentication and key agreement protocol
based on Mishra et al.âĂŹs protocol. Wang et al. claimed their protocol provides various security features along-with user
revocation/re-registration and biometric information protection. Soon, AG Reddy et al. [38] showed that Wang et al.’s [42]
protocol is vulnerable to server impersonation, user impersonation and insider attacks, as their protocol share user credential
to the server. Qi et al.’s [34] proposed yet another key-exchange authentication protocol and claimed it to provide security
against well-known attacks. later AG Reddy et al.’s [37] noticed some vulnerabilities like session key leakage attack, user
impersonation attack, insider attack, and user anonymity in the protocol of Qi et al.
Very recently, Barman et al. [6] proposed a provably secure multi-server authentication protocol using fuzzy commitment.
The authors in [6] claimed that their protocol provides various security features like confidentiality of user identity/biometric
data, mutual authentication and session key establishment between user and servers, besides this authors also claimed
their protocol to provide security against the known attacks. However, the in-depth analysis in this article shows that the
protocol of Barman et al. is facing some serious security threats. It is to show that the protocol proposed by Barman et al.
is vulnerable to anonymity violation attack and impersonation attack based on stolen smart-card. Moreover, their protocol
is not practicable owing to the scalability issues. Then we propose an improved and enhanced protocol to overcome the
security weaknesses of Barman et al.’s protocol. We analyze the security of our proposed protocol through formal and
informal analysis. In the formal analysis, we used a BAN Login and widely accepted AVISPA tool, a well known and widely
accepted automated tool for security analysis . The informal security features analysis also shows the robustness of the
proposed protocol.
2 Preliminaries
A brief review of the basics relating to fuzzy commitment technique, one-way hash function, error correction coding, and
revocable template generation, is solicited in this section.
2.1 Fuzzy Commitment
The fuzzy commitment as proposed by Juels and Wattenberg [21] is a method to hide the secrets under the witness and then
release the conceal secrets later in the presence of a witness. In the Registration/enrollment phase a randomly generated
key Kc is cipher with codeword Cw = ℵenc(Kc). ℵenc is an error correction technique and it helps in a noisy channel to
recover equivalent match. When a user imprints his biometric then the binary string is generated against that biometric
CTu used to conceal the key with binary string through XOR operation [CTu ⊕ Cw = Hpublic]. The system contain only
Hpublic and the hash of key (h(Kc)). In the authentication phase this Hpublic is available, so every legitimate user imprints
his/her biometric to unlock Cw.
2.2 Hash Function
Hash function h: X −→ Y is deterministic mapping set X = {0, 1}∗ of strings having variable length to another set Y =
{0, 1}t of strings of fixed length, properties include:
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– The input value say, a ∈ X it is easy to compute h(a), in polynomial times moreover, h(.) function is deterministic in
nature.
– The change in input value a ∈ X results in a completely uncorrelated with h(a).
– One−Way property : It is difficult to find the actual message x given the message digest h(a) of a ∈ X.
– Weak − Collision resistant property: Any given value input a ∈ X. it is difficult to find another a∗ ∈ X such that
h(a) = h(a∗).
– Strong − Collision resistance property: h(a) = h(a∗) for any a, a∗ ∈ X and a 6= a∗, this property states that, it is
also difficult to find any two inputs a, a∗ ∈ X such that a 6= a∗ with h(a) = h(a∗).
2.3 Revocable Template Generation
A revocable template [36], provides the privacy and Revocability of user biometric. By using transformation parameter
TPu and transformation function, f(·), user biometric data is convert into a cancel able template CTu = f(BIOu, TPu),
properties includes:
1. Collision-free property: If CTu = f(BIOu, TPu) and CTk = f(BIOk, TPk), then CTu 6= CTk. for BIOu 6= BIOk.
Moreover, if CTn = f(BIO, TPn) and CTm = f(BIO, TPm), then CTn 6= CTm for TPn 6= TPm.
2. Intra-user variability property : This property states; two different templates CTu = f(BIOu, TPu), CT
′
u =
f(BIO′u, TPu) can be generated form same fingerprint.
3. Revocation of biometric: If user biometric is comprised, then new template can be generated by using new transfor-
mation parameter TPnewu with same transformation function f(·).
4. User confidentiality: Cancel-able template should protect the confidentiality of user, moreover template should protect
the information about original biometric of a user.
2.4 Error Correction Technique
In the biometric template, the intra-user variation is considered an error. To remove the errors in the user biometric
template, error correction technique [18] is used for noisy biometric image. In the time of enrollment/Registration
CTenrolu = f(BIOenrolu , TPu) is generated, which is match with query template CTqueryu = f(BIOqueryu , TPu), at the
authentication time. So the difference can be calculated through Hamming distance e = HamDis(CTenrolu , CTqueryu).
2.5 Adversarial Model
According to the well known and widely accepted Dolev-Yao threat (DY) model [15], an attacker not only listen to the
communication between two participants but also the attacker can change the entire message or delete the message as well
on open channel. An attacker can also extract the secret credential of legitimate user form stolen smart card through power
analysis attack [22,30]. Second adversarial model is Canetti and Krawczyk model (CK-model). In authentication and key
exchange protocol, it is considered as De-facto standard. According to the (CK-adversary model) [9], it is not only fallowed
Dolev-Yao threat (DY) model but the adversary is also able to get the session key and session states as well.
2.6 Our contributions
1. We have cryptanalyzed the recent fuzzy commitment based multi-server authentication protocol proposed by Barman et
al.’s [6] to find out its security issues and vulnerabilities.
2. We proposed an improved and enhanced authentication protocol based on Barman et al.’s [6]
3. The security of the proposed protocol is checked through BAN logic and widely accepted AVISPA.
4. The security discussion and security features comparisons of the proposed protocol with related protocols including
Barman et al.’s protocol is explained.
5. We have also provided the comparative computation and communication costs analysis of the proposed protocol with
competing related protocols
2.7 Notations
The notations used in this paper are provided in fig 1.
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Symbols Representations
Uu,Sk user and server
SIDk identity of server
IDu, PWu, BIOu identity, password and biometric of Uu
CTu, TPu, f(.) cancel-able template, transformation parameter
and transformation function of Uu
RC trusted registration center
Xc secret/private key of RC
XRk shared keys between Sk and RC
EXc , DXc encryption and decryption using private key of RC
Rcu user’s random number
Hu fuzzy commitment helper data
SKu,k session key between user Uu, Sk
PSKk secret/private key of Sk
h(.) hash function
Ru, rn, Rs random number generated by Uu, RC, Sk
T1, T2, T3, time stamped generated by Uu, RC, Sk
Tu time bound generated by Sk
∆T time delay
⊕, ‖ (XOR) and string concatenation operator
ℵenc(.),ℵdec(.) encoding and decoding operator ,
of the error correction technique
SCu, Aadv smart card and adversary
Fig. 1 Notations
3 Review Of Barman et al’s Protocol
This section briefly reviews Barman et al.’s protocol [6]. The six phases of the protocol are detailed in following subsection:
3.1 Server Registration Procedure
In Barman et al protocol, all servers Sk : (1 ≤ k ≤ n), where n denotes the total number of servers in the network. Initially,
all servers Sk, (1 ≤ k ≤ n) will registered with RC. Every server Sk selects their particular identity SIDk and dispatches a
registration request to the RC. RC sends a secret key PSKK = h(SIDk||Xc) to each Sk(1 ≤ k ≤ n). RC may also consider
another n′ servers, which will register themselves with the RC near in future. Therefore, the RC chooses their identities
SIDS and generates the shared keys PSKS = h(SIDS ||Xc) for n+ 1 ≤ S ≤ n+ n′ The server identities (for n+ n′ server)
along with their corresponding key pairs (SIDk, PSKk)|1 ≤ k ≤ n+ n′ are stored in RC database.
3.2 User Registration Procedure
The detail steps of the user registration phase are defined below:
1. Initially, every user Uu needs to register with the RC to gets the services, via a protected channel. Uu select a unique
user identity IDu, and password PWu, a transformation parameter TPu and a random number Rcu. Uu also imprint
BIOu.
2. Uu produce the cancel-able biometric template using transformation functions CTu = f(BIOu, TPu) and computes
RPWu = h(PWu||CTu), ru = h(Rcu||IDu||PWu). Uu. Uu then generates a random secret ku and sends the registration
request 〈IDu, RPWu ⊕ ku〉 to the RC, via a protected channel.
3. After checking validity of IDu. RC computes USk = h(IDu||PSKk), AMk = USk⊕(RPWu⊕ku), SVk = h(SIDk||PSKk)
and BMk = SVk⊕RPWu ⊕ ku for 1 ≤ k ≤ (n+ n′). RC issues a smart card SCu having {(SIDk, AMk, BMk)|1 ≤ k ≤
(n+ n′)} and sends it to Uu, via a protected channel.
4. Using error correction technique ε. Uu encodes Rcu produced codeword Rcod = εenc(Rcu), computes Hu = CTu⊕Rcod, R
= h(Rcu) and P = h(ru). Uu then computes AMuk = (AMk⊕ku)⊕ru and BMuk = (BMk⊕ku)⊕ru for 1 ≤ k ≤ (n+n′).
Uu stores {(AMuk, BMuk)}|1 ≤ k ≤ (n+ n′), TPu,Hu, R, P, h(·),ℵenc(·),ℵdec(·)} in smart card SCu. Uu cancels the
Rcu,BIOu, CTu, ru, AMk and BMk for security reasons.
3.3 Login Procedure
The detail steps of login request are:
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1. Uu inserts the smart card into the terminal and provides the credentials IDu, PWu and BIO
′
u for authentication.
2. The smart card SCu generates the cancel-able fingerprint CT
′
u = f(BIO
′
u, TPu), and extracts R
′
cod = Hu ⊕ CT
′
u and
then decodes R′cod using error correction technique, Rc
′
u = ℵdec(R
′
cod). SCu compares both values, h(Rc
′
u) with R which
is stored in SCu. If they are equal than proceed further else terminate the session.
3. SCu computes r
′
u = h(Rcu||IDu||PWu) and checks if h(r
′
u) = h(ru), proceed further otherwise terminate the session.
4. SCu computes USk = AMuk ⊕ h(PWu||CTu) ⊕ r′u = h(IDu||PSKk) and SVk = BMuk ⊕ h(PWu||CTu) ⊕ r
′
u =
h(SIDk||PSKk). SCu selects a random numberRu, generates current time stamp T1, and computesM ′1 = h(IDu||USk),M
′
2 =
IDu ⊕ h(SVk||T1),M3 =M1 ⊕Ru,M4 = h(IDu||M ′1||M
′
2||T1||Ru).
5. Finally, SCu sends the request 〈M ′2,M
′
3,M
′
4, T1〉 to the server Sk.
3.4 Mutual Authentication and Key Agreement Procedure
The mutual authentication and key agreement consist of following steps:
1. Sk receives login request 〈M ′2,M
′
3,M
′
4, T1〉 at time T
′
1 and after computing the time delay, |T
′
1 − T1|. Computes M
′
5 =
M
′
2 ⊕ h(h(SIDk|| PSKk)||T1),M
′
6 = h(M
′
5||h(M
′
5||PSKk)) M
′
7 = M
′
3 ⊕M
′
6 = Ru and M
′
8 = h(M
′
5||M
′
6||M
′
2||T1||M
′
7).
Check if M ′8 6=M
′
4, Sk cancel the login request, else proceed further.
2. Sk select a random number Rs and generates T3 then computes M
′
9 = h(h(M
′
5||PSk)||Ru) ⊕ Rs, and session key
SKuk =h(M
′
5||h(SIDk||PSKk)||Ru||Rs||T1||T3) and M
′
10 = h(h(M
′
5||PSKk)||SKuk||T3||Rs) sends 〈M
′
9,M
′
10, T3〉 to Uu.
3. The Uu receives 〈M ′9,M
′
10, T3〉. After checking the delay |T3 ≤ Tc|. SCu computes R
′
s =M
′
9 ⊕ h(USk||Ru), the session
key SK ′uk = h(IDu||SVk||Ru||Rs||T1||T3) shared with Sk and M
′
11 = h(USk||SK
′
uk||T3||R
′
s). SCu check the condition if
M
′
11 6=M
′
10 terminated. Otherwise, the session key SKuk is established between Uu and Sk.
3.5 Password and Biometric Template Update Procedure
Uu provides the current credentials IDu, PWu BIOu and extracts feature BIO
′
u from the BIOu. SCu then computes CT
′
u =
f(BIO′u, TPu) and Rc
′
u = ℵdec(Hu ⊕ CT
′
u) and then check if h(Rc
′
u) = R,SCu further computes r
′
u = h(Rc
′
u||IDu||PWu)
check if h(r′u) = P proceed further otherwise terminate. SCu then request to the user Uu to modify their password and
biometric template.
1. To update the password, Uu inputs PWnewu . Then, SCu computes rnewu = h(Rc
′
u||IDu|| PWnewu ), AMnewuk = AMuk⊕r
′
u⊕
rnewu = h(IDu||PSKu)⊕h(PW
′
new||CTu)⊕ h(Rc
′
u ||IDu||PWnewu ), BMnewuk = BMuk⊕ r
′
u⊕ rnewu = h(SIDk||PSKk)⊕
h(PWnew||CTu)⊕ h(Rc′u ||IDu ||PWnewu ) for 1 ≤ k ≤ (n + n
′) and Pnew = h(rnewu ).SCu updates its parameters
{AMuk, BMuk, } with the newly computed values {AMnewuk ,BMnewuk , Pnew} and stored in the SCu.
2. To update the biometric template, SCu request Uu for a new transformation parameter TPu. SCu have the old
TPu and then set new TPnewu = TPu and new cancel-able template is produce CTnewu = f(BIO
′
u, TP
new
u ). SCu
also computes RPWnewu = h(PWu||CTnewu ), AMnewuk = AMuk ⊕ RPWu ⊕ RPWnewu = h(IDu|| PSKk) ⊕ h(PWu
||CTnewu )r
′
u, BM
new
uk = BMuk⊕RPWu⊕ RPWnewu = h(SIDk|| PSKk)⊕h(PWu||CTnewu )⊕r
′
u, and the new helper data
Hnewu = CTnewu ⊕ℵenc(Rc
′
u). Accordingly, the information {AMuk, BMuk, Hu} is replaced by {AMnewij BMnewuk , Hnewu }
stored in the SCu .
3.6 Smart Card Revocation Procedure
If the SCu of a authorized Uu is damaged, lost or stolen, then Uu can get a new SCu from the RC. Uu provides IDu and
PWu and to imprint BIOu, Steps are:
1. Uu computes CT
′
u = f(BIOu, TPu) and RPWu = h(PWu||CT
′
u), Uu generates a random number k
′
u, then computes a
parameter RPW ′u = RPWu ⊕ k
′
u and then sends the request 〈IDu, RPW
′
u〉 to the RC via a protected channel for a
new SCnewu
2. RC computes AMk = h(IDu||PSKk)⊕RPW ′u, BMk = h(SIDk||PSKk)⊕RPW
′
u for k = 1, 2, , , , , , (n+ n
′) and issue
a new SCnewu containing {(SIDk, AMk, BMk)|1 ≤ k ≤ n+ n′}. SCnewu sends to these parameter to Uu via a protected
channel.
3. Uu generates a new random number Rnewu and computes ru = h(Rnewu ||IDu||PWu), Hnewu = CT
′
u⊕ℵenc(Rnewu ), AMuk =
(AMk ⊕ k′u)⊕ ru, BMuk = (BMk ⊕ k
′
u)⊕ ru, R = h(Rcnewu ), P = h(ru) and stores these values in SCnewu , memory. Uu
also stores {TPu,ℵenc(·),ℵdec(·), h(·)} in SCnewu memory.
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4 Cryptanalysis of Barman et al. protocol
Barman et al.’s protocol [6] provides multi-server based authentication protocol using a fuzzy commitment approach. The in
depth analysis proves that the protocol entails serious security flaws as described in following subsections:
4.1 Incomplete Login Request
The login message, {M ′2,M
′
3,M
′
4, T1} sent by user Uu to the server Sk is incomplete, because the identity of server SIDk is
not included in the login request, which is the most important parameter while communication [29] and without the server
identity, the RC cannot direct the request of Uu to his intended server. This crucial mistake may be treated as typing
mistake. The protocol can only work if the login message contains the identity of the server.
4.2 User Anonymity Violations Attack
Here, we show that the protocol of Barman et al. is vulnerable to user anonymity violation attack. Let Ua be a legal
but dishonest user of the system and wants to violate user anonymity. In the Mutual Authentication phase of Barman
et al.’s protocol user Uu sends the message {M ′2,M
′
3,M
′
4, T1, SIDk} to the server SIDk on public channel. During the
communication, let Ua intercepts the message and from M
′
2 = IDu ⊕ h(SVk‖T1), Ua can easily extract the IDu of every
users. Because all the users connected to the SIDk has SVk(secret identifier generated by RC for SIDk) which are stored
in the smart card. Ua can extract the identity of user as follows:
Step AV 1: Uu sends the login message to SIDk. During the communication, let user Ua intercepts the message
{M ′2,M
′
3,M
′
4, T1, SIDk}.
Step AV 2: Ua using his own smart card, enters his credentials including: IDa, PWa and BIOa. Ua extracts {BMak, AMak}
pair from his own smart card and then computes CTa = f(BIOa, TPa), R
′
cod = Ha ⊕ CTa, Rc
′
a = ℵdec(R
′
cod),
ra = h(Rcu||IDa||PWa), similar to login steps. Ua then computes:
USka = AMak ⊕ h(PWa||CTa)⊕ ra (1)
SVk = BMak ⊕ h(PWa||CTa)⊕ r′a = h(SIDk||PSKk) (2)
Z = h(SVk||T1) (3)
Step AV 3: Based on SVk, Z and the M
′
2 from login request, Ua computes:
IDu =M
′
2 ⊕ Z (4)
In Eq.4, the IDu is the real identity of Uu. Therefore, Ua has successfully broke the user anonymity.
4.3 User Impersonation Attack based on stolen smart card
Using the stolen smart card of some user say Ua, another legal but dishonest user of the system can launch user impersonation
attack in Barman et al.’s protocol. Let Ua be a legal user, gets his card SCa containing {SIDk, AMak , BMak |1 ≤ k ≤ (n+n
′)}
along with {TPa, Ha, P, h(·),ℵenc,ℵdec} and steals the smart card SCu of Ua performs following steps to impersonate on
behalf of Uu:
Step ISC 1: Ua enter his credential IDa, PWa and biometricBIOa. Ua computes USk, CT
′
a, r
′
a, SVk = BMuk⊕h(PWa||CTa)⊕
r
′
a = h(SIDk||PSKk). As SVk is common in all smart cards.
Step ISC 2: Extracts AMku = USku ⊕ (RPWu ⊕ ku) and BMuk = SVk ⊕ (RPWu ⊕ ku) form Uu’s stolen smart card SCu.
Step ISC 3: Ua using SVk computes:
X = AMku ⊕BMku = {USku ⊕ (RPWu ⊕ ku)} ⊕ {SVk ⊕ (RPWu ⊕ ku)} (5)
X = USku ⊕ SVk (6)
USku = X ⊕ SVk (7)
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Step ISC 4: Ua has SVk and USku of Uu with IDu. Uu generates a random number Ru and time stamp T1 computes:
M
′
1 = h(IDu||USk) (8)
M
′
2 = IDu ⊕ h(SVk||T1) (9)
M
′
3 =M
′
1 ⊕Ru (10)
M
′
4 = h(IDu||M
′
1||M
′
2||T1||Ru) (11)
Step ISC 5: Ua sends the login request message 〈M ′2,M
′
3, M
′
4, T1, SIDk〉 to the Sk. Sk receives the login request
〈M ′2,M
′
3,M
′
4, T1, SIDk〉 after checking time delay, |T
′
1 − TS1|, computes following:
M
′
5 =M
′
2 ⊕ h(h(SIDk||PSKk)||T1) = (IDu) (12)
M
′
6 = h(M
′
5||h(M
′
5||PSKk)) (13)
M
′
7 =M
′
3 ⊕M
′
6 = Ru (14)
M
′
8 = h(M
′
5||M
′
6||M
′
2||T1||M
′
7) (15)
Step ISC 6: Sk checks if M
′
8 =M
′
4, Uu will pass this test because M
′
8 and M
′
4 both have same values. Therefore user Ua
pass test on behalf of Uu. Sk selects a nonce Rs, generates current time stamp T3, and computes:
M
′
9 = h(h(M
′
5||PSk)||Ru)⊕Rs (16)
SKuk = h(M
′
5||h(SIDk||PSKk)||Ru||Rs||T1||T3) (17)
M
′
10 = h(h(M
′
5||PSKk)||SKuk||T3||Rs) (18)
Step ISC 7: Then, Sk sends 〈M ′9, M
′
10, T3〉 to Ua. Ua receives the authentication request message 〈M
′
9,M
′
10, T3〉 at time
T
′
3. Ua computes following:
Rs =M
′
9 ⊕ h(USk||Ru) (19)
SK
′
uk = h(IDu||SVk||Ru||Rs||T1||T3) (20)
M
′
11 = h(USk||SK
′
uk||T3||Rs) (21)
The session key as computed by Ua in Eq. 20 is same as computed by Sk in Eq.17. Therefore, Ua has succesffuly established
a secure connection with Sk by impersonating on behalf of Ua.
4.4 Scalability problem
In the registration phase of Barman et al.’s protocol smart card stores AMk. As in multi-server environment, there may be
several servers and users. So it is inefficient to store (AMk) against every server within smart card due to its small magnetic
chip which has limited storage. This protocol is not practical, suppose we have n servers, so we need to store USk and SVk
of n servers within the smart card, each of size 160 bits. For large number of servers like 100, the bits stored for USk and
SVk in the smart card are 32000 bits, which can be problematic due to its storage restrictions. Moreover, authors did not
mention the procedure to update the smart card if some new servers are added, AMuk = (AMk ⊕ ku)⊕ ru and BMuk =
(BMk ⊕ ku)⊕ ru for 1 ≤ k ≤ (n+ n′).
5 Proposed Protocol
This section details the proposed scheme consisting of three entities including, users, servers and the Registration Center
(RC). The details are in following subsections:
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5.1 Server Registration Phase
Every Sk along with its particular identity SIDk must send a registration request to the RC, if they are willing to
provide services to the legitimate users Uu. RC computes XRSk = h(SIDk||Xc) and Mk = EXc(XRSk) and stores
(SIDk, EXc(XRSk)) in the database of Rc and send the share key to the server (XRSk).
5.2 User Registration Phase
Uu chooses IDu, PWu, TPu, then imprint BIOu and selects random number N1. Uu computes CTu = f(BIOu, TPu), Au =
h(N1||PWu||IDu||CTu) and sends Au, IDu to the RC. On receiving RC computes Xu = h(IDu||Xc) and Yu = Xu⊕Au
then generate a random number ro and compute the pseudo identity PIDu = EXc(IDu||ro)⊕Au, then store Yu, P IDu, h(.)
in smart card. RC sends the smart card to user using some secure channel. On receiving smart card, Uu computes
Rc = ℵenc(Rcu), Hu = CTu ⊕ Rcod, R = h(Rcu), ru = (Rcu||IDu||PWu), P = h(ru) and Eu = N1 ⊕ ru. Uu stores
{TPu, Hu, R, P, h(.), ℵenc(·),ℵdec(·), Yu, P IDu, Eu} in the smart card.
Server Registration Center
choose SIDk
SIDk−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Secure−channel
compute XRSk = h(SIDk||Xc)
Mk = EXc (XRSk )
Stored (SIDk, EXc (XRSk ))
in Database(RC)
(XRSk )←−−−−−−−−−−−−
Channel−Secure
Stores (XRSk ) in Database(Server)
Users/Smart Card Registration center
Chooses IDu, PWu, TPu
Imprint BIOu
Selects N1
Computes CTu = f(BIOu, TPu)
Au = h(N1||PWu||IDu||CTu)
Au,IDu−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
SECURE−CHANNEL
compute Xu = h(IDu||Xc)
Yu = Xu ⊕Au
Generates ro
PIDu = EXc (IDu||ro)⊕Au
Stores Yu, P IDu, h(.) in SCu
Yu,PIDu,h(.)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
SECURE−CHANNEL
Rcod = ℵenc(Rcu)
Hu = CTu ⊕Rcod, R = h(Rcu)
ru = (Rcu||IDu||PWu)
P = h(ru)
Eu = N1 ⊕ ru
Stores {TPu, Hu, R, P, h(.)
ℵenc(·),ℵdec(·)
Yu, P IDu, Eu} in SCu
Fig. 2 Registration phase of Sever and User
5.3 Login and Authentication Phase
The following steps define the login and authentication phase briefly:
Step AP 1: User need to insert the smart card provides the credentials IDu, PWu, BIO
′
u and calculate CT
′
u = f(BIO
′
u, TPu),
R
′
cod = Hu ⊕ CT
′
u, Rc
′
u = ℵdec(R
′
cod), and check if h(Rc
′
u) 6= R, terminate the session, otherwise calculate r
′
u =
h(Rc′u||IDu||PWu), and check again if h(r
′
u) 6= h(ru) terminate the session, else compute N1 = (Eu ⊕ ru), A
′
u =
h(IDu||PWu||N1||CTu), Xu = (Yu ⊕ A′u), DIDu = (PIDu ⊕ A
′
u), generate a random no Ru and time stamp
T1, and to get the services of server needs the address SIDk, and computes Gu = Ru ⊕ h(Xu||IDu||SIDk||T1),
Hu = h(IDu||Gu||Xu||Ru||T1||SIDk), sends {DIDu, Hu, Gu, T1, SIDk} to the Registration on public channel.
Step AP 2: RC receives the login request and checks the time delay (Tc−T1 ≤ δT ). RC decrypts (IDu||ro) = DXc(PIDu)
using Xc and computes Xu = h(IDu||Xc) Ru = Gu ⊕ h(Xu||IDu||SIDk||T1) H ′u = h(IDu||Gu||Xu||Ru||T1||SIDk).
RC then check H ′u
?= Hu if not true, terminates the session. Otherwise, RC verify user successfully, and then RC
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extracts XRSk from verifier table of RC, and generate time stamp T2 computes X
′
u = h(Xu||IDu||SIDk||T1), HRc =
h(XRSk ||X
′
u||IDu||SIDk||T2), and encrypt the parameters (X
′
u, Ru, IDu, HRc , SIDk, T1, T2) using share secret key
XRSk and sends EXRSk , (X
′
u Ru, IDu, HRc , SIDk, T1, T2) ,SIDk to the server over public channel.
Step AP 3: On receiving the message, Sk after checking the time delay (Tc−T2 ≤ δT ), decrypts DXRSk (X
′
u, Ru, IDu, HRc ,
SIDk, T1) using the shared key XRSk . Sk then computes H
′
Rc
= h(XRSk || X
′
u||IDu||SIDk||T2) and checks the
equality H ′Rc
?= HRc if condition is true, Sk verifies RC successfully. Further Sk generates Rs, T3 and computes
Mx = Rs ⊕ h(IDu||X ′u||Ru||T3) H
′′
Rc
= h(Rs||Mx||Tu||IDu|| T3). Sk further sends {Mx, H ′′Rc , T3, Tu, } to the RC,
which in turn checks (Tc − T3 ≤ δT ) and in successful verification computes Rs = Mx ⊕ (IDu||X ′u||Ru||T3) H
′′′
Rc
=
h(Rs||Mx||Tu||IDu||T3). RC then checks H ′′′Rc
?= H ′′Rc terminates the session on success; otherwise, computes new
dynamic identity RIDu = EXc(IDu||rn)⊕Rs for Uu and forwards {Mx, H
′′
Rc
, T3, Tu, RIDu} to the legitimate user Uu.
Step AP 4: Uu on receiving the message, checks T3 ≤ δTc and on success computes Rs =Mx ⊕ (IDu||X ′u||Ru||T3), H
′′′′
Rc
=
h(Rs||Mx||Tu||IDu||T3) and checks whether H ′′′′Rc
?= H ′′Rc if true then session key SKuk = h(X
′
u||IDu||SIDk||Rs||Ru) is
established between user and server.
5.4 Password and Biometric Update Process
In this section, we also proposed the password change and biometric template update process of our protocol, the Uu will
need to log in successfully to change their current password and update their biometric template, The detailed steps are
described below:
Step CPB 1: Uu provides the credentials IDu, PWu, and BIOu after inserting the smart-card into a card reader to login.
BIO
′
u is extracted from the captured BIOu. SCu then computes CT
′
u = f(BIO
′
u, TPu) and R
′
cu = εdec(Hu ⊕ CT
′
u).
Checks if h(R′cu) = R, then SCu computes r
′
i = h(R
′
cu||IDu||PWu), and check if h(r
′
i) = P , smart card then asks users
Uu to change their password and update their biometric template.
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Uu RC Sk
Insert Smart card
Inputs IDu, PWu, BIO
′
u
Calculates CT ′u = f(BIO
′
u, TPu)
R
′
cod = Hu ⊕ CT
′
u
Rc
′
u = ℵdec(R
′
cod)
Checks h(Rc′u) = R?
Calculates r′u = h(Rc
′
u||IDu||PWu)
Checks h(r′u) = h(ru)?
Computes N1 = (Eu ⊕ ru)
A
′
u = h(IDu||PWu||N1||CTu)
Xu = (Yu ⊕A′u)
DIDu = (PIDu ⊕A′u)
Generates Ru & T1
Gu = Ru ⊕ h(Xu||IDu||SIDk||T1)
Hu = h(IDu||Gu||Xu||Ru||T1||SIDk)
{M1=(DIDu,Hu,Gu,T1,SIDk)}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Checks (Tc − T1 ≤ δT )
(IDu||ro) = DXc (DIDu)
Computes Xu = h(IDu||Xc)
Ru = Gu ⊕ h(Xu||IDu||SIDk||T1)
H
′
u = h(IDu||Gu||Xu||Ru||T1||SIDk)
Checks H′u
?= Hu
Extracts XRSk from verifier table
Generates T2
Computes X′u = h(Xu||IDu||SIDk||T1)
HRc = h(XRSk ||X
′
u||IDu||SIDk||T2)
EXRSk
(X′u, Ru, IDu, HRc , SIDk, T1, T2)
{M2=(EXRSk (X
′
u,Ru,IDu,HRc ,SIDk,T1),T2,SIDk)}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Check (Tc − T2 ≤ δT )
Server Decrypt using their share key
DXRSk
(X′u, Ru, IDu, HRc , SIDk, T1)
Compute H′Rc = h(XRSk ||X
′
u||IDu||SIDk||T2)
Check H′Rc
?= HRc
Server verify Rc Successfully
Generate random no Rs time stamp T3
Compute Mx = Rs ⊕ h(IDu||X′u||Ru||T3)
H
′′
Rc
= h(Rs||Mx||Tu||IDu||T3)
{M3=(Mx,H
′′
Rc
,T3,Tu)}←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Check (Tc − T3 ≤ δT )
Compute Rs =Mx ⊕ h(IDu||X′u||Ru||T3)
Generate rn
RIDu = EXc (IDu||rn)⊕Rs
H
′′′
Rc
= h(Rs||Mx||Tu||IDu||T3)
Check H′′′Rc
?= H′′Rc
{M4=(Mx,H
′′
Rc
,T3,Tu,RIDu)}←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Checks (Tc − T3 ≤ δT )
Computes Rs =Mx ⊕ h(IDu||X′u||Ru||T3)
H
′′′′
Rc
= h(Rs||Mx||Tu||IDu||T3)
Checks H′′′′Rc
?= H′′Rc
DIDnew = RIDu ⊕Rs ⊕A′u
Replaces DIDu by DIDnew
SKuk = h(X
′
u||IDu||SIDk||Rs||Ru)
Fig. 3 Login and Authentication phase
Step CPB 2: For password change, SCu asks Uu for a new password. Uu inputs the new password PWnewu . SCu computes
rnewu = h(R
′
cu||IDu||PWnewu ), Enewu = N1⊕ rnewu and Pnew = h(rnewi ). SCu updates its parameters stored {TPu, Hu, R,
Pnew, h(·), εenc(·), εdec(·), Yu, P IDu, Enewu } in smart card in its memory.
Step CPB 3: To update the biometric template, SCu asks Uu for a new transformation parameter TPnewi . The new
cancel-able template is generated as CTnewi = f(BIOu, TPnewi ), and the new helper data Hnewi = CTnewi ⊕ εenc(R
′
ci)
and are stored in SCu.
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5.5 Smart Card Revocation Procedure
In this section, we proposed the smart card revocation, if the SCu of the legitimate user Uu is damaged, lost or stolen, then
RC will issue the new smart card. For this process, the user provides their credential IDu, PWu, BIOu. The following steps
are essential to complete this procedure:
Step SCR 1: Uu computes CT
′
i = f(BIOi, TPi) and generates a 160-bit secret N
′
1, then computes A
′
u = h(N
′
1||PWu||IDu||
CT
′
u), and transmits the request message {A
′
u, IDu} to the RC via a protected channel for SCnewu .
Step SCR 2: RC computes Xu = h(IDu||Xc), Y ′u = Xu⊕A
′
u, generate random r
′
o and computes PID
′
u = EXc(IDu||r
′
o)⊕
A
′
u store Y
′
u, P ID
′
u, h(.) in SCu, then issue a SCnewi containing the credentials , Yu, P ID
′
u, h(.). SCnewi is then sent to
Ui via a protected channel.
Step SCR 3: Uu computes r
′
u = h(Rcnewi ||IDu||PWu), Hunew = CT
′
u ⊕ εenc(Rcnewu ), , R = h(Rcnewu ), P = h(ru) and stores
these values in SCnewi memory.
6 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze our protocol using widely accepted Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic [8], used to check the
mutual authentication between the user Uu, server Sk and registration center RC, The notation used in the BAN logic is
given in fig 4.
Fig. 4 Notations
6.1 Rules of BAN-Logic
The rules of authentication protocol are clearly mentioned in [8], which illustrate that if only one rule is violate, then the
entire protocol is consider as flawed. Rules are define table in 1:
Rules Definition
Rule 1 Message Meaning M|≡M
K←→N.M<A>K
M|≡N|∼A
Rule 2 Nonce Verification M|≡#(A),M|≡N|∼A
M|≡N|≡A
Rule 3 Jurisdiction M|≡N⇒A,M|≡N|≡A
M|≡A
Rule 4 Acceptance Conjuncatenation M|≡ A,M|≡B
M|≡(A,B)
Rule 5 Freshness Conjuncatenation M|≡#(A)
M|≡#(A,B)
Rule 6 Session Key M|≡#(A),M|≡N≡A
M|≡ M K←→N
Table 1 Rules of BAN-Logic
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6.2 Assumptions
– A1:Uu| ≡ #(Ru, T1)
– A2:Sk| ≡ #(Rs, T3, Tu)
– A3:RC| ≡ #(T2)
– A4:RC| ≡ Uu| ≡ #(Ru, T1)
– A5:RC| ≡ Sk| ≡ #(Ru, T1)
– A6:RC| ≡ RC XRSk←→ Sk
– A7:Sk| ≡ RC
XRSk←→ Sk
– A8:RC| ≡ Uu ⇒ Ru
– A9:RC| ≡ Sk ⇒ Rs, Tu
– A10:Uu| ≡ RC| ≡ Sk| ≡ #(Rs, T3, Tu)
– A11:Sk| ≡ RC| ≡ Uu| ≡ #(Ru, T1)
– A12:RC| ≡ Uu| ≡ Sk| SKuk←→ Uu
– A13:RC| ≡ Sk| ≡ Uu| SKuk←→ Sk
6.3 Goals
– Uu| ≡ Uu SKuk←→ Sk
– Sk| ≡ Uu SKuk←→ Sk
The Idealized Form of Messages Four message are used in session key agreement process which are:
– Messages(1)Uu −→ RC:{DIDu, Hu, Gu, T1, SIDk}
– Messages(2)RC −→ Sk:{EXRSk (X
′
u, Ru, IDu, HRc , SIDk, T1, T2), SIDk}
– Messages(3)Sk ←− RC:{Mx, H ′′Rc , T3, Tu}
– Messages(4)RC ←− Uu:{Mx, H ′′Rc , T3, Tu, RIDu}
M1:- Uu  {DIDu, Hu, Gu, T1, SIDk} or Uu  {IDu, ro}Xc , h(IDu, Gu, Xu, Ru, T1, SIDk), Ru⊕ h(Xu, IDu, SIDk, T1),
T1, SIDk >..........Eq.(A)
M2:- Sk < {X ′u, Ru, IDu, HRc , SIDk, T1, T2}Xc , SIDk > or Sk {h(Xu, IDu, T1), h(XRSk , X
′
u, IDu, SIDk, T2),Ru, IDu, SIDk, T1, T2}Xc , SIDk, >......Eq.(B)
M3:- RC < Mx, H
′′
Rc
, T3, Tu > or Rc < Rs ⊕ h(IDu, X ′u, Ru, T3), h(Rs,Mx, Tu, IDu, T3), T3, Tu >.....Eq.(C)
M4:- Uu< Mx, H
′′
Rc
, T3, Tu, RIDu > orRc< Ui⊕h(IDu, X ′u, Ru, T3), h(Rs,Mx, Tu, IDu, T3), T3, Tu, {IDu, rn}Xc .....Eq.(D)
6.4 Protocol Analysis
The main security proofs are consist of the following steps:
– From message "M1" using (A1, A12) and Rule-1 we get
BN1: RC| ≡ Uu ∼ Ru
– Using A1 and Rule-2 on "BN1" we get
BN2: RC| ≡ Uu| ≡ Ru
– Using A8 and Rule-3 on "BN2" we get.
BN3: RC| ≡ Ru
RC believes that Ru is fresh based on A3 and Rule-5
– From message "M2" using A7 and Rule-1 we get
BN4: Sk| ≡ RC ∼ XRSk
– Using (A7, A11) and Rule-3 on "BN4" we get
BN5: Sk ≡ XRSk
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Server believes that XRSk is secret parameter which is only known to Sk and RC. Using (A7, A11) and Rule-6 on
"BN5" we get
BN6: Sk| ≡ Uu SKuk←→ Sk Goal-1 achieved
– From message "M3" using (A2, A5) and Rule-1 we get
BN6: RC| ≡ Sk ∼ (Rs, T3, Tu)
– Using A2 and (Rule-2) on "BN6" we get
BN7: RC| ≡ Sk| ≡ (Rs, T3, Tu)
– Using A9 and Rule-3 on "BN7" we get
BN8: RC| ≡ (Rs, T3, Tu)
– From message "M4" using (A4, A10) and Rule-1 we get
BN9: Uu| ≡ RC ∼ (Rs, T3, Tu, RIDu)
– Using (A10) and Rule-3 on "BN9" we get
BN10: Uu| ≡ RC| ≡ (Rs, T3, Tu, RIDu)
– Using A9 and Rule-3 on "BN10" we get
BN11: Uu| ≡ (Rs, T3, Tu, RIDu)
Uu believes that (Rs, T3, Tu, RIDu) are fresh. Rs is an important parameter for session key agreement process.
– Using A1 and Rule-6 on "BN11" we get
BN12: Uu ≡ Uu SKuk←→ Sk. Goal-2 achieved
7 Discussion on Functional Security
Following subsection solicits brief discussions on several security features and resistance to known attacks provided by the
proposed scheme.
7.1 Anonymity and Untraceability
In the authentication protocol, user anonymity and untraceability are substantial aspects and if anonymity is broken, an
adversary Aadv can easily recover sensitive information of the legitimate user like his current location, moving tracks, a
personal record and social circle, etc. In the registration phase RC encrypt the identity with random number EXc(IDu||ro)
by using his own secret key Xc. SCu does not store this pseudo identity directly, as it is hidden by PIDu, So even if the
smart card were stolen by Aadv he will still be incapable to get the identity of the user. Moreover, after each successful
authentication request, this pseudo-identity is dynamically changed. Therefore, the proposed protocol provides anonymity
and untreceability.
7.2 Impersonation Attacks
To act as RC an Aadv required the secret key Xc of RC, which is hash with user identity h(IDu||Xc), to compute the
session key SK = h(X ′u||IDu||SIDk||Rs||Ru) an Aadv also requires to first compute Xu = h(IDu||Xc). In addition Xu
is also used in the construction of RC signature that is, X ′u = h(Xu||IDu||SIDk||T1). So without secret key Xc an Aadv
does not impersonate themselves as RC. Similarly to act as legitimate user an Aadv will required a valid login request
that is,{DIDu, Hu, Gu, T1, SIDk}. To get all these values an Aadv needs the user credential like password PWu as well as
biometric BIOu.
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7.3 Replay Attack
Our protocol combat replay attack against all the login and authentication messages. Suppose an Aadv replays a past message
that is {DIDu, Hu, Gu, T1, SIDk}. then on receiving side RC will always check the time-stamp T1, as T1 is outdated, RC
will considered as replay, they neglect the message request.
7.4 Stolen Verifier Attack
Our protocol is fully secured against stolen verifier attack. RC encrypt shared key EXc(XRSk) using their own secret key
Xc to handle stored verifier table, so adversary does not extract anything without knowing the Xc.
7.5 Privileged Insider Attack
The proposed protocol successfully prevents a privilege insider attack. In the registration phase IDu andAu = h(N1||PWu||IDu||CTu)
are sent to RC, where password PWu identity IDu a random number N1 and cancel able template CTu are protected by
one way hash function. So it is impossible for an insider to guess these value.
7.6 Password Guessing Attacks
The proposed protocol is fully secured against the password guessing attack. Suppose RC take the screen shot of the user
sensitive parameters like {TPu, Hu, R, P, h(.)ℵenc(·),ℵdec(·) Yu, P IDu, Eu} which is stored on user smart card. Then they
still requires the cancel-able transformation parameter CTu along with N1. Moreover, an Aadv still needs to guess identity
IDu and password PWu of user, if they unfortunately gets the N1 and CTu.
7.7 Denial of Services Attack
Our protocol is fully protected against the denial of services. SCu checks the validity of identity IDu, password PWu and
template CTu. If Aadv or legitimate user try to enter the incorrect values, then the SCu just simply cancel the request.
7.8 Perfect Forward Secrecy
The proposed protocol posses the prefect forward secrecy. The shared session key SKuk = h(X
′
u||IDu||SIDk||Rs||Ru)
incorporate a random number Ru used by the user. Suppose if RC signature X
′
c is exposed to some Aadv he will not be
able to compute previously shared session keys.
7.9 Resolve the Scalability Issues
In previous protocol the smart card store the AMuk = (AMk ⊕ k′u) ⊕ ru, BMuk = (BMk ⊕ k
′
u) ⊕ ru for every server
1 ≤ k ≤ (n+ n′), which is insufficient to store (AMk) within smart card due to its small magnetic chip which has limited
storage. In the proposed protocol there is no such parameter which stored the information of a server.
8 Simulation tool for Formal Security Verification Using AVISPA Tool
In this section, we analyze proposed protocol using formal simulation tool, for this purpose a well known and widely accepted
AVISPA [4] tool, is used for security verification used by different authentication protocols [10,13,41,43]. AVISPA
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Fig. 5 Role specification of user Fig. 6 Role specification of server
implements the HLPSL language which is then translated into the intermediate formate (IF) with the help of translator
known as "hlpsl2if". Four back ends are used by IF, to check security goals, is satisfied or disrupt. The output shows safe,
unsafe or unsatisfactory. Details are mentioned in [4]. We define the three basic role i.e. role of user Uu, role of registration
center RC and role of server Sk along with the session (between these participant), environment role and goals fig[5,6,7,8],
are stated in HLPSL. The results of AVISPA are shown in fig[9] which tells that proposed protocol is secure against man in
the middle attack as well as replay attack. The OFMC back end shows the parse time: 0.00 seconds, the search time: 42.16
seconds, the number of visited nodes is 3344 and the depth 12 plies. whereas ATSE analyzes 8 states, the translation time is
0.98 seconds. Hence, form this results it is shown our protocol provides better security against Barman et al.’s protocol [6].
Although the search time, the translation time is slightly high compared to Barman et al.’s protocol, because the number of
visited nodes depth of proposed protocol is greater than the previous protocol.
Fig. 7 Role specification of Rc Fig. 8 Role specification of Session/Goal
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Fig. 9 Results of OFMC and CL-AtSe backends
9 Performance Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed protocol with other multi-server authentication protocols. The
purpose of performance analysis is to check resilience of proposed protocol against various attacks.
9.1 Security and functionality comparisons
The security and functionality comparison of proposed scheme with related schemes is solicited in Table 9.1 under the
DY and CK adversarial model as described in subsection 2.5. The security comparison shows that only proposed scheme
provides resistance to all known attacks and fulfills related security features; whereas, all the competing schemes either
lacks one or more security features or vulnerable to some security attacks.
Property/Feature Our [6] [12] [3] [40] [32] [19] [28] [1]
FUN1 3 7 7 3 3 7 7 7 7
FUN2 3 3 3 3 7 3 3 3 3
FUN3 3 3 3 7 3 3 3 3 3
FUN4 3 7 3 3 7 3 3 3 3
FUN5 3 7 3 3 7 3 3 3 3
FUN6 3 3 3 3 7 3 3 3 3
FUN7 3 7 3 3 3 7 3 3 3
FUN8 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
FUN9 3 3 3 7 7 3 3 3 3
FUN10 3 3 3 3 3 3 7 7 3
FUN11 3 3 3 7 7 3 3 7 7
FUN1: user anonymity violation and untraceability; FUN2: three-factor security feature; FUN3: er-
ror detection mechanism; FUN4: participant having mutual authentication; FUN5: exchange of session
key; FUN6: password update security; FUN7: resistance against stolen smart card attack; FUN8: re-
sistance against offline password guessing; FUN9: resistance against replay attack; FUN10:resistance
against forgery attack; FUN11: resistance against privileged-insider attack.
3: a protocol safeguard the security functionality feature; 7: a protocol is lack of the security functionality
feature.
Table 2 Security and functionality features comparison
9.2 Computation cost
In this subsection, we compare our protocol with the existing multi-server authentication protocols considering the
computation cost of login and authentication phases. The following notation used for computation cost describe below:
• FHcost : one-way cryptographic hash cost
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• FBHcost : bio-hashing cost
• FFEcost : fuzzy extractor cost
• FFCScost : fuzzy commitment cost
• FECMcost : ecc point multiplication cost
• FASYMcost : asymmetric key encryption/decryption cost
• FEnccost : cost of block cipher encryption
The experimental results disclosed in [38], we choose FHcost = 0.0023 ms, FEnccost = 0.0046 ms, FECMcost = 2.226 ms and
FASYMcost = 0.0046 ms. Furthermore, FFEcost = FECMcost , we also assume FBHcost = FECMcost and FFCScost = FECMcost .
Although our protocol has slightly high computation cost compared to Barman et al [6], but the security level of our
protocol is high. The comparison are briefly shown in Table 3.
Protocol Login phase Authentication phase Total cost Rough estimation (ms)
Chuang-Chen [12] 4Ch 13Ch 17Ch 0.0391
Amin-Biswas [3] Cbh + 4Ch 14Ch Cbh + 18Ch 2.2674
Sood [40] 7Chc 24Ch 31Ch 0.0713
Mishra [32] 6Ch 12Ch 18Ch 0.0414
He-Wang [19] 3Ch + 2Cecm 18Ch + 6Cecm 21Ch + 8Cecm 17.856
Lu [28] Cbh + 4Ch 11Ch Cbh + 15Ch 2.2605
Ali-Pal [1] 6Ch + Casym + Cbh 7Ch + Casym 13Ch + Cbh + 2Casym 2.2651
Barman [6] Cfcs + 6Ch 11Ch Cfcs + 17Ch 2.2651
Our Cfcs + 6Ch 13Ch + 1CEXc + 1ChDXc Cfcs + 19Ch + 1CEXc + 1ChDXc 2.2789
Table 3 Computation costs comparison
9.3 Communication cost
In this subsection, we evaluate and compare the communication cost of proposed with existing protocols. During the
login and authentication phases, the communication cost is computed by the total number of bits which is transmitted to
other parties in the network, over a protected channel. We are assuming the "SHA-1" hash function which has the cost
of 160 bits [7], in the symmetric key encryption/decryption, has the cost of 256 bits of length [23], time stamp is 32 bits
of length, an elliptic curve point P = (Pa, Pb) is 160 length of bits, where Pa and Pb is x and y coordinate of P point.
Furthermore the security of RSA [39] public key cryptosystem is 1024-bit which is comparable to ECC (elliptic curve
cryptography) of 160-bits of length [5]. In the proposed protocol, the communication cost for the login request message
{DIDu, Hu, Gu, T1, SIDk}, which is transmitted from a user Uu to theRC has cost of (160+160+160+32+32) = 544 bits of
length and the message {EXRSk (X
′
u, Ru, IDu, HRc , SIDk, T1), SIDk, T2} transmitted to server Sk from RC is (256+32+32)
= 332 bits and the message transmitted to RC from server Sk is {Mx, H ′′Rc , T3, Tu, } (160+160+32+32) = 384 bits and
message transmitted to Uu from RC is {Mx, H ′′Rc , T3, Tu, RIDu} (160+160+32+32+160) = 544 bits hence, the total number
of bits for communication is (544+332+384+544) = 1804 bits. The comparison results are shown in Table 4.
protocol Cost in login phase Cost in authentication phase Total cost Communication mode
Chuang-Chen [12] 512 512 1024 Uu −→ Sk, Sk −→ Uu
Amin-Biswas [3] 768 1152 1920 Uu −→MS,MS −→ PS, PS −→ Uu
Sood [40] 896 1216 2112 Uu −→ Sk, Sk −→ CS,CS −→ Sk, Sk −→ Uu, Uu −→ Sk
Mishra [32] 640 640 1280 Uu −→ Sk, Sk −→ Uu, Uu −→ Sk
He-Wang [19] 640 2880 3520 Uu −→ Sk, Sk −→ RC,RC −→ Sk, Sk −→ Uu, Uu −→ Sk
Lu [28] 672 554 1226 Uu −→ Sk, Sk −→ Uu, Uu −→ Sk
Ali-Pal [1] 1344 320 1664 Uu −→ Sk, Sk −→ Uu
Barman [6] 544 1164 896 Uu −→ Sk, Sk −→ Uk
Our 544 1260 1804 Uu −→ RC,RC −→ Sk, RC ←− Sk, Uu ←− RC
Table 4 Communication cost comparison
10 Conclusion
Very recently Barman et al. presented a provably secure multi-server authentication protocol using fuzzy commitment. The
authors claimed that their protocol provides various security services like privacy preservation of userâĂŹs identity and
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biometric data, mutual authentication and session key establishment between user and servers. Furthermore, barman et al.
also claimed that their protocol is secure against all known attacks. However, the analysis in this paper shows that Barman
et al.’s protocol cannot withstand user anonymity violation as well as impersonation attack alongwith the scalability issues.
Then we proposed an improved and enhanced protocol to fix the weaknesses of Barman et al.’s protocol. The proposed
protocol is more robust than Barman et al. and related protocols which is evident from rigorous formal and informal security
analysis. We have also validated the security of the proposed protocol by simulation in popular and widely accepted security
analysis tool AVISPA.
References
1. Ali, R., Pal, A.K.: Three-factor-based confidentiality-preserving remote user authentication scheme in multi-server environment.
Arabian Journal for Science and Engineering 42(8), 3655–3672 (2017)
2. Amin, R., Biswas, G.: A novel user authentication and key agreement protocol for accessing multi-medical server usable in tmis.
Journal of medical systems 39(3), 33 (2015)
3. Amin, R., Biswas, G.: A novel user authentication and key agreement protocol for accessing multi-medical server usable in tmis.
Journal of medical systems 39(3), 33 (2015)
4. Armando, A., Basin, D., Cuellar, J., Rusinowitch, M., Viganò, L.: Avispa: automated validation of internet security protocols and
applications. ERCIM News 64(January) (2006)
5. Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr, W., Polk, W., Smid, M.: Recommendation for key management part 1: General (revision 3). NIST
special publication 800(57), 1–147 (2012)
6. Barman, S., Das, A.K., Samanta, D., Chattopadhyay, S., Rodrigues, J.J., Park, Y.: Provably secure multi-server authentication
protocol using fuzzy commitment. IEEE Access 6, 38,578–38,594 (2018)
7. Burrows, J.: Secure hash standard. fips pub 180-1, national institute of standards and technology (nist), us department of commerce,
april 1995 (2015)
8. Burrows, M., Abadi, M., Needham, R.M.: A logic of authentication. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. A. Mathematical
and Physical Sciences 426(1871), 233–271 (1989)
9. Canetti, R., Krawczyk, H.: Analysis of key-exchange protocols and their use for building secure channels. In: International Conference
on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, pp. 453–474. Springer (2001)
10. Chattaraj, D., Sarma, M., Das, A.K.: A new two-server authentication and key agreement protocol for accessing secure cloud services.
Computer Networks 131, 144–164 (2018)
11. Chaudhry, S.A., Naqvi, H., Khan, M.K.: An enhanced lightweight anonymous biometric based authentication scheme for tmis.
Multimedia Tools and Applications 77(5), 5503–5524 (2018)
12. Chuang, M.C., Chen, M.C.: An anonymous multi-server authenticated key agreement scheme based on trust computing using smart
cards and biometrics. Expert Systems with Applications 41(4), 1411–1418 (2014)
13. Das, A.K., Odelu, V., Goswami, A.: A secure and robust user authenticated key agreement scheme for hierarchical multi-medical
server environment in tmis. Journal of medical systems 39(9), 92 (2015)
14. Debiao, H., Jianhua, C., Rui, Z.: A more secure authentication scheme for telecare medicine information systems. Journal of Medical
Systems 36(3), 1989–1995 (2012)
15. Dolev, D., Yao, A.: On the security of public key protocols. IEEE Transactions on information theory 29(2), 198–208 (1983)
16. Fan, C.I., Chan, Y.C., Zhang, Z.K.: Robust remote authentication scheme with smart cards. Computers & Security 24(8), 619–628
(2005)
17. Fan, C.I., Lin, Y.H.: Provably secure remote truly three-factor authentication scheme with privacy protection on biometrics. IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 4(4), 933–945 (2009)
18. Hao, F., Anderson, R., Daugman, J.: Combining crypto with biometrics effectively. IEEE transactions on computers 55(9), 1081–1088
(2006)
19. He, D., Wang, D.: Robust biometrics-based authentication scheme for multiserver environment. IEEE Systems Journal 9(3), 816–823
(2014)
20. Juang, W.S., Chen, S.T., Liaw, H.T.: Robust and efficient password-authenticated key agreement using smart cards. IEEE Transactions
on Industrial Electronics 55(6), 2551–2556 (2008)
21. Juels, A., Wattenberg, M.: A fuzzy commitment scheme. In: Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and communications
security, pp. 28–36. ACM (1999)
22. Kocher, P., Jaffe, J., Jun, B.: Differential power analysis. In: Annual International Cryptology Conference, pp. 388–397. Springer
(1999)
23. Kumar, V., Ahmad, M., Kumari, A., Kumari, S., Khan, M.: Sebap: A secure and efficient biometric-assisted authentication protocol
using ecc for vehicular cloud computing. International Journal of Communication Systems p. e4103 (2019)
24. Lamport, L.: Password authentication with insecure communication. Communications of the ACM 24(11), 770–772 (1981)
25. Lee, J., Ryu, S., Yoo, K.: Fingerprint-based remote user authentication scheme using smart cards. Electronics Letters 38(12), 554–555
(2002)
26. Li, C.T., Hwang, M.S.: An efficient biometrics-based remote user authentication scheme using smart cards. Journal of Network and
computer applications 33(1), 1–5 (2010)
27. Lin, C.H., Lai, Y.Y.: A flexible biometrics remote user authentication scheme. Computer Standards & Interfaces 27(1), 19–23 (2004)
28. Lu, Y., Li, L., Yang, X., Yang, Y.: Robust biometrics based authentication and key agreement scheme for multi-server environments
using smart cards. PLoS One 10(5), e0126,323 (2015)
29. Lwamo, N.M., Zhu, L., Xu, C., Sharif, K., Liu, X., Zhang, C.: Suaa: A secure user authentication scheme with anonymity for the
single & multi-server environments. Information Sciences 477, 369–385 (2019)
30. Messerges, T.S., Dabbish, E.A., Sloan, R.H.: Examining smart-card security under the threat of power analysis attacks. IEEE
transactions on computers 51(5), 541–552 (2002)
A Secure and Improved Multi Server Authentication Protocol Using Fuzzy Commitment 19
31. Mir, O., Nikooghadam, M.: A secure biometrics based authentication with key agreement scheme in telemedicine networks for e-health
services. Wireless Personal Communications 83(4), 2439–2461 (2015)
32. Mishra, D., Das, A.K., Mukhopadhyay, S.: A secure user anonymity-preserving biometric-based multi-server authenticated key
agreement scheme using smart cards. Expert Systems with Applications 41(18), 8129–8143 (2014)
33. Mitchell, C.J., Tang, Q.: Security of the lin-lai smart card based user authentication scheme. Technical Report (2005)
34. Qi, M., Chen, J.: An efficient two-party authentication key exchange protocol for mobile environment. International Journal of
Communication Systems 30(16), e3341 (2017)
35. Qi, M., Chen, J.: New robust biometrics-based mutual authentication scheme with key agreement using elliptic curve cryptography.
Multimedia Tools and Applications 77(18), 23,335–23,351 (2018)
36. Ratha, N.K., Chikkerur, S., Connell, J.H., Bolle, R.M.: Generating cancelable fingerprint templates. IEEE Transactions on pattern
analysis and machine intelligence 29(4), 561–572 (2007)
37. Reddy, A.G., Das, A.K., Odelu, V., Ahmad, A., Shin, J.S.: A privacy preserving three-factor authenticated key agreement protocol for
client–server environment. Journal of Ambient Intelligence and Humanized Computing pp. 1–20 (2018)
38. Reddy, A.G., Yoon, E.J., Das, A.K., Odelu, V., Yoo, K.Y.: Design of mutually authenticated key agreement protocol resistant to
impersonation attacks for multi-server environment. IEEE access 5, 3622–3639 (2017)
39. Rivest, R.L., Shamir, A., Adleman, L.: A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Communications of
the ACM 21(2), 120–126 (1978)
40. Sood, S.K., Sarje, A.K., Singh, K.: A secure dynamic identity based authentication protocol for multi-server architecture. Journal of
Network and Computer Applications 34(2), 609–618 (2011)
41. Srinivas, J., Das, A.K., Kumar, N., Rodrigues, J.: Cloud centric authentication for wearable healthcare monitoring system. IEEE
Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing (2018)
42. Wang, C., Zhang, X., Zheng, Z.: Cryptanalysis and improvement of a biometric-based multi-server authentication and key agreement
scheme. Plos one 11(2), e0149,173 (2016)
43. Wazid, M., Das, A.K., Odelu, V., Kumar, N., Conti, M., Jo, M.: Design of secure user authenticated key management protocol for
generic iot networks. IEEE Internet of Things Journal 5(1), 269–282 (2017)
44. Wu, Z.Y., Lee, Y.C., Lai, F., Lee, H.C., Chung, Y.: A secure authentication scheme for telecare medicine information systems. Journal
of medical systems 36(3), 1529–1535 (2012)
45. Zhu, Z.: An efficient authentication scheme for telecare medicine information systems. Journal of medical systems 36(6), 3833–3838
(2012)
